Jews, Bolsheviks and the Murder of Tsar Nicholas II and the Romanov Family

Jews, Bolsheviks and the Murder of Tsar Nicholas II and the Romanov Family

The murder of the Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and his family on the 17th July 1918 was one of several epoch-defining moments that occurred in the 20th century the murder was that acted as motivational element for nationalists across Europe: in particular in Germany where the nascent National Socialist Germany Workers Party (the NSDAP) supported the candidacy of Grand Prince Kirill Romanov. (1)

It is an event which sent shockwaves through Europe and assured that the 20th century would - to use Eric Hobsbawm's term for it - forever be known as the 'Age of Extremes'. For the murder of the Tsar meant that for one of the great European empires: Russia. There was little prospect to return to how it was without the man that made it so and thus made a political choice necessary for ordinary Russians that they had to get behind the Bolshevik revolution, actively fight against it or leave for a life of exile from the motherland.

What the murder also meant was that Western attitudes towards would-be Bolsheviks and the left in general significantly hardened giving rise to new action-orientated non-traditional patriotic groups - such as the Fascisti of Italy as well as the CEDA and Falange of Spain - who began a process of national revival across Europe that was cut short and then crushed by the Second World War.

The role of the jews - specifically four directly and two indirectly - in the murder of the Tsar has long been well-known among writers and researchers on the subject of the last of the Romanovs. Although some have sought to dismiss this jewishness as being inconsequential: they do not as a rule even attempt to deny it as to do so is evidentially absurd.

Of the four jews the first - and the man who actually killed the Tsar - was Yakov Yurovsky: (2) a long-time Bolshevik activist and also an individual who was then steadily rising through the ranks of the Cheka. (3) Yurovsky was also the man who served as the last; as well as the harshest, gaoler of the Romanovs in addition to possibly being a young protégée of Joseph Stalin. (4)

The second is a man who called himself Filipp Goloschekin, but in actuality his real name (as opposed to his party name) was Isay Isaakovich. (5) He was Sverdlov's envoy to the Urals Regional Soviet headed by a lacklustre local Bolshevik named Beloborokov and was the man who controlled the decisions and behaviour of the Soviet. (6) Goloschekin was no new figure to the Bolshevik party given that he had sat on the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Party (that was later to split forming both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks) along with Lenin in 1909 and 1912. (7)

Goloschekin - as the head of the regional Cheka - (8) was Yurovsky's direct superior and the man who it was who deliberately brought the Romanovs into his power with - in all probability - the wish as well as the means to kill them. (9) It was Goloschekin who had masterminded the unanimous vote of the Urals Regional Soviet to kill the Tsar with all possible speed on the 29th June 1918 (10) as well as who left on the 3rd June 1918 to meet with his Bolshevik superiors in Moscow (Sverdlov and Lenin respectively [who are the other two responsible parties]) (11) to discuss what should be done with the Tsar. (12)

When he returned on the 12th July 1918 Goloschekin brought verbal orders from Sverdlov and Lenin to murder the Tsar, which would give them plausible deniability and allow them to cast the brutal murder of the Romanovs as being the independent act of Goloschekin and Yurovsky, which was how the event was subsequently portrayed by obedient Soviet historians. (13)

As Service has noted Lenin's reasoning behind the murder maybe simply summed up as follows:

'He exterminated Romanovs because they had misruled Russia. But he also turned to such measures because he enjoyed – really enjoyed – letting himself loose against people in general from the ancien regime.' (14)

What Service leaves out is that Lenin had a special reason to hate Nicholas II - aside from his overt rationalization of class war - given that Lenin was partly jewish (15) and Nicholas II had overseen a major effort to fight against the jews and jewish power in the Russian Empire. (16) It is difficult to conceive of Lenin's homicidal nature towards the Romanovs - who had also hanged his brother (after all jews supplied most of the leadership and supporters of left wing revolutionary parties in pre-Bolshevik Russia) - (17) without thinking that at least part of it was because he was himself the grandson of a jew.

Yakov Sverdlov - who was the 'man behind the curtain' of Lenin's government and in many ways its true architect - (18) is well-known to have been jewish and to have had - like Lenin - a fanatical hatred of the Romanovs (19) that was almost unique to jewish revolutionaries. (20) Less well-known is the fact that Goloschekin - as observant readers may have guessed from his real name - was jew who had originally trained to be a dentist (21) and Yurovsky was the staunchly jewish grandson of a well-regarded Polish rabbi. (22)

With all this in mind we need to remember that the murder of the Tsar was inevitable as long as he was in Bolshevik hands precisely because he was a symbol of hope to the enemies of Bolshevism (even those who didn't want to see him restored to the throne) as well as a symbol of the old regime and everything the Bolsheviks professed to despise.

The problem that confronted the Bolsheviks in relation to the Tsar was not whether they should kill him, but rather how and when they should do it. The reason for this dilemma was simple enough: the Bolsheviks were not a monolithic party, but rather a coalition of many different elements with their own Marxist ideological priorities. There were the radicals around Trotsky, the pragmatists around Lenin and Sverdlov as well as the more traditional Marxists around Bukharin (the latter being rather marginalized in the Bolshevik party due to their ideological association with the Mensheviks).

Each of these groups were engaged in a political struggle with the others for political and ideological supremacy within the Bolshevik party and while Trotsky wanted to emulate the French Revolution and put the Tsar on trial for his life. (23) Lenin and Sverdlov wanted the Tsar murdered at a convenient time, but only once they had squeezed the last bit of diplomatic and domestic advantage, they could out of him. (24)

Lenin and Sverdlov were keen to retain their control of the Tsar - which is illustrated by their choice of their long-time and trusted associate Goloschekin to take charge of him - but were also unwilling to allow the Tsar to fall into the hands of their enemies precisely because in doing so they would destabilize their own political positions and hand a propaganda coup to their enemies both within the Bolshevik party and without on the battlefields of Russia.

This is why when removing the Tsar from Ekaterinburg without significant risk of him being liberated by the Whites became impossible: Yurovsky was ordered to murder him and his family, while other elements of the Cheka wiped out the other captured members of the Romanov family held at Alapaevsk in the northern Urals on Goloschekin's orders. (25)

This then gives us something approaching the conventional narrative about the Tsar being murdered by the Bolsheviks to prevent him falling the hands of the White armies (and specifically the Czech Legion). (26)

This however completely leaves out the fact that the jewish Bolsheviks who made the decision to; as well as carrying out the, murder the Tsar and his family had long planned that it would happen. This took the form of the resolution by the Urals Regional Soviet - conceived by and directed by Goloschekin - on the 29th June 1918 giving Lenin and Sverdlov a way to kill the Tsar and represent it as the 'will of the people' (Goloschekin having left to officially present this rationale to them in person).

This lead to the changeover in command at 'The House of Special Purpose' from the non-jew Aleksandr Avdeev to the jew Yakov Yurovsky on 4th July 1918: (27) who in turn replaced most of the guards with mercenaries/Cheka personnel, strengthened the security and introduced a much harsher regime on the Romanov family. (28)

This is compounded by the fact that on 6th July 1918 Yurovsky's guards received brand new American-made weapons in the form of Colt pistols and Maxim machine guns. (29) These were badly needed on the frontlines where Bolshevik troops were suffering shortages of everything from food to bullets to serviceable weapons. However suddenly an already well-armed guard detachment were given brand new weapons that would be more likely to be in perfect working order.

Clearly they had a special task ahead of them and with Goloschekin in Moscow till the 12th July 1918: (30) it is clear that Yurovsky and his men were being armed in order to make sure that the murder of the Tsar and his family would go as smoothly as possible.

This is also borne out by the fact that the Urals Regional Soviet's resolution, Goloschekin's departure to consult with Lenin and Sverdlov and Yurovsky's arrival to replace Avdeev only occur after the failure of an attempt to resolve the problem presented by the Tsar by murdering him and his family while they were trying to escape.

This was achieved by a letter that the Romanovs received from an anonymous monarchist officer on the 20th June 1918, which asked for information about their situation in the prison so they could be freed in an organized breakout. As Rappaport has pointed out: the elementary mistakes in the letter (such as not referring the Tsar as 'Your Majesty' or 'Your Highness') point to it being a creation of the Cheka themselves. (31)

This was the first of 4 letters that reached the Tsar and his family from their supposed supporter: the culmination of the letters was that on the 25th June the Tsar and his family would shimmy down a rope made of bedclothes from a window and be rescued by the anonymous monarchist officer and his supporters. (32)

Rather too conveniently Avdeev had  on the 25th June (the date of the escape letter and on the night of which it was due to happen), suddenly relented and allowed the Romanovs the ability to open one of the windows in their apartment. (33) What the Romanovs (who decided against the plan thinking it unworkable) (34) didn't know and couldn't have known was that the Cheka had machine gun nests (with new American-made Maxim machine guns remember) trained on said window (notably from the nearby church tower). (35)

Clearly escaping via this window was a death sentence, but if the Tsar and his family had attempted to do so it would have allowed the Bolsheviks to murder them in a relatively neutral way. Indeed the blame for their deaths could be cast upon the victims themselves for trying to escape and thus would solve the problem of how to deal with Trotsky's ambitious plans for a trial of the Tsar, free up the troops guarding him and his family as well as score a propaganda coup for the Bolshevik cause by executing the Tsar without formally executing him.

That this plot to indirectly execute the Tsar failed coupled with the continuing rapid advance of the Czech Legion on Ekaterinburg meant that the Bolsheviks no longer really had the option of subtlety if they wished to prevent the Tsar falling into the hands of his friends and supporters. They had to murder him and to do so directly required both a precedent and authorization at the highest level as well as speedy operational preparations locally.

This is the origin of the unanimous resolution for the murder of the Tsar from the Urals Regional Soviet - which remember Goloschekin controlled - on 29th June: two days after the Romanovs declared to their 'anonymous monarchist officer' that they 'no longer wished to be rescued'. (36) As well as why Goloschekin immediately left with this 'warrant from the people' to consult with Lenin and Sverdlov in person (which was extraordinary behaviour on Goloschekin's part) and also why the order confirming the replacement of Avdeev with Yurovsky (who had likely been involved in the attempt to murder the Tsar while they were escaping) on the 4th July 1918 (i.e. the day after Goloschekin arrived) came through when it did.

That Yurovsky already had his orders and that they came from the very top of the Bolshevik regime is indicated by his immediately replacing Avdeev's guards with those of his own choice, the brand new (rare) weapons that were shipped to him on 6th July as well as why he began requisitioning 400 pounds of sulphuric acid to be used in the disposal of the bodies well before he was given his official orders by Goloschekin.

Goloschekin's arrival on 12th July with the formal verbal order from Lenin and Sverdlov to (brutally) murder (37) the Tsar and his family was merely the final go that Yurovsky needed to carry out the murders. That this was a deliberate conspiracy to murder the Romanovs - as opposed to an act of simple desperation - is also shown by the fact that the Bolsheviks had executed the Tsar's brother Grand Duke Mikhail on the 12th/13th June to gauge the international and domestic response to such murders (38) as well the fact that the day after the Tsar was killed the Bolsheviks simply murdered every Romanov they held captive whether or not they were liable to be liberated from captivity or not. (39)

Once we understand this fact then it is clear that the Bolsheviks always intended to murder the Tsar and all of the Romanov family, but were attempting to do so at a time and in such a way as it provided them with best advantage. The only reason they did when they did so was because all their other stratagems had been unsuccessful and if they moved the Tsar again: there was a significant risk that he could (and would) be liberated by the advancing Czech Legion, which was to them an unacceptable risk.

This then makes the composition of the decision-making and operational command apparatus of special importance precisely because if this apparatus was universally jewish then it means that the murder of Tsar Nicholas II and the Romanov family was conducted purely by jewish Bolsheviks giving good evidence of the truth of the Judeo-Bolshevism thesis (i.e. the jews largely controlled the Bolshevik party and [at least] the early Soviet Union).

By way of a concluding summary let us remind ourselves of what and who that apparatus precisely consisted of:

Vladimir Lenin
(Part-Jewish Head of the Soviet State)


Yakov Sverdlov
(Jewish Chair of the Bolshevik Central Executive Committee)


Filipp Goloschekin
(aka Isay Isaakovich)
(Jewish Member of the Presidium of the Urals Regional Soviet and de facto Head of the Urals Cheka)


Yakov Yurovsky
(Jewish Head of 'The House of Special Purpose' and member of Ekaterinburg Cheka)

Who then murdered the Tsar and his family on 17th July 1918.

Now who says that jewish Bolsheviks didn't play a key part in the murder Tsar Nicholas II and the Romanov family?


(1) Michael Kellogg, 2005, 'The Russian Roots of Nazism: White Émigrés and the Making of National Socialism 1917-1945', 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press: New York, p. 14
(2) Andrew Cook, 2011, 'The Murder of the Romanovs', 1st Edition, Amberley: Stroud, p. 162
(3) Helen Rappaport, 2009, 'Ekaterinburg: The Last Days of the Romanovs', 1st Edition, Random House: London, p. 33
(4) Ibid, p. 32
(5) Ibid, p. 130
(6) Ibid, p. 131
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Cook, Op. Cit., pp. 147-149
(10) Rappaport, Op. Cit., p. 41
(11) Orlando Figes, 1997, 'A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924', 1st Edition, Pimlico: London, p. 638; Robert Service, 2003, 'A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin', 2nd Edition, Penguin: New York, p. 107; Robert Service, 2011, 'Spies & Commissars: Bolshevik Russia and the West', 1st Edition, MacMillan: Basingstoke, pp. 120-121
(12) Robert Massie, 2000, [1967], 'Nicholas & Alexandra', 1st Edition, Phoenix: London, p. 489
(13) Service, 'Spies', Op. Cit., p. 120
(14) Robert Service, 2000, 'Lenin: A Biography', 1st Edition, MacMillan: Basingstoke, p. 364
(15) Ibid, p. 18
(16) For a useful summary see Benjamin Pinkus, 1988, 'The Jews of the Soviet Union: The History of a National Minority', 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press: New York, pp. 23-33
(17) Robert Service, 2007, 'Comrades. Communism: A World History', 1st Edition, MacMillan: Basingstoke, pp. 136-137
(18) Rappaport, Op. Cit., pp. 104-105
(19) See Leon Trotsky's diary quoted in Figes, Op. Cit., p. 638
(20) Indicated by the decision not to use ordinary Russian revolutionaries or Cheka units to kill the Romanovs, but rather a special unit of 3 long established fanatical members of the Cheka with a unit of predominately non-Russian mercenaries as a reserve force. See Cook, Op. Cit., pp. 158-163 as well as Figes, Op. Cit., p. 640
(21) Rappaport, Op. Cit., p. 130
(22) Ibid, pp. 31-32; Figes, Op. Cit., p. 640
(23) Cook, Op. Cit., p. 149; Rappaport, Op. Cit., pp. 140-143; Service, 'Spies', Op. Cit., p. 121
(24) Rappaport, Op. Cit., pp. 68-69; 136-137
(25) Figes, Op. Cit., p. 641
(26) See Nicholas Riasanovsky, 1993, 'A History of Russia', 5th Edition, Oxford University Press: New York, pp. 481-182
(27) Rappaport, Op. Cit., pp. 139-140
(28) Cook, Op. Cit., p. 159
(29) Ibid, p. 158
(30) Ibid, p. 159
(31) Rappaport, Op. Cit., pp. 122-123
(32) Ibid, p. 124
(33) Ibid, p. 123
(34) Ibid, p. 124
(35) Cook, Op. Cit., p. 155
(36) Rappaport, Op. Cit., p. 124
(37) See William Henry Chamberlain, 1987, 'The Russian Revolution', Vol. II, 1st Edition, Princeton University Press: Princeton, p. 91
(38) Rappaport, Op. Cit., p. 38
(39) Figes, Op. Cit., p. 641